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This article analyzes the historical background of the institutionalization of user fees and their subsequent abolition
in West Africa. Based on a narrative review, we present the context that frames the different articles in this
supplement. We first show that a general consensus has emerged internationally against user fees, which were
imposed widely in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s; at that time, the institutionalization of user fees was supported
by evidence from pilot projects funded by international aid agencies. Since then there have been other pilot
projects studying the abolition of user fees in the 2000s, but these have not yet had any real influence on public
policies, which are often still chaotic. This perplexing situation might be explained more by ideologies and political
will than by insufficient financial capacity of states.
Introduction
In this article, we present the general context of health-
care access in West Africa and interventions that have
been aimed at improving access. Over and above the
issues of geographic barriers and quality of care that are
part of the long list of determinants of healthcare use
[1], one of the greatest obstacles to access to care
remains people’s capacity to pay. Clearly, this article is
not meant to minimize the importance of non-financial
barriers [2], but in the context of this Supplement,
which is focused on recent user fee abolition policies,
our presentation of the general background is oriented
toward issues of financial access. In the history of
attempts to remove this financial obstacle, the train that
has been rolling for the past 30 years has always been
made up of two types of cars: pilot projects and public
policies. These two processes of very different scopes-
the first at the local level and most often organized by
international aid agencies or researchers, the second at
the national level and organized by the State-are some-
times sequential and, at other times, overlapping and
interconnected. In this article, we consider that the for-
mulation of public policy results partly from a
sustainability process, notably through actions imple-
mented as pilot projects, for which a key outcome is the
institutionalization of policy instruments [3,4]-in this
case, related to user fees. Pilot projects are understood
here as being innovative interventions whose aim is to
produce evidence and to influence scale-ups through the
formulation of public policy [5].
Our aim in this analysis is to show that this intercon-
nection has not yet been sufficiently effective, such that
current user fee abolition policies are still not able to
improve equity of access to the healthcare system. This
article does not present a systematic review of the lit-
erature on this topic, as several such reviews have
already been published in recent years [6-8]. Rather,
our more modest aim is to provide an overview of the
general background from a diachronic perspective,
based on a narrative review [9] of the scientific and
grey literatures.
The disappearance of consensus around user fees
Let us begin with an image, that of the zombie. If this
image is more familiar to readers of Haitian history than
to those interested in public policy in West Africa, it is
because the writings of certain health economists have
not yet penetrated all borders. Robert Evans, a well-
known Canadian economist, has used the zombie image
for the past 20 years in talking about user fees. Despite
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the fact that the scientific evidence that should ‘kill’ this
method of payment is very solid, it does not seem to
want to die, surfacing time and again in political dis-
course and proposals, like the living dead [10]. Against all
evidence [7,11], some health economists working in West
Africa continue to assert that user fees have no influence
on households’ capacity to go to a health centre, or
that recent fee exemption policies do not benefit the
poor [12,13].
However, this appears to be a minority opinion, as an
analysis of 120 documents published by 50 actors in the
global health sector between 2005 and 2011 shows that
almost no one now supports user fees [13]. The 1980s
trend (not a consensus) toward user fees, due largely to
strong international influence [14] and decision-makers’
pragmatic need to find a solution to dramatic reductions
in public funding for health [15], has thus been comple-
tely reversed. Even the economist who authored the
notorious 1985 World Bank report that triggered waves
of generalized user fees in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s
has since changed his position [16]. In 2012, he called
for the principle of user fees to be overturned [17]. Like-
wise, the president of the World Bank asserted, at the
World Health Assembly in May 2013, that it is time to
abolish user fees, whose existence, in his words, is
“unjust and unnecessary”. Some might think these chan-
ging trends are simply the latest fad. However, user fees
are a technical instrument about which there is clear
evidence. If there is any fad involved, it has more to do
with organizations’ readiness to accept this evidence
than with the current state of knowledge about user
fees.
Along the same lines, 15 years ago some authors
hypothesized that public policies targeting the population
at large, with no specific measures for the worst-off,
would primarily benefit the most affluent [18]. This is, in
fact, a significant issue, as the most recent fee exemption
policies target broad social groups (pregnant women,
children under five, etc.) universally. Recently that
author, too, refuted his own hypothesis. He showed that,
on the contrary, it is most often in countries where the
coverage of interventions (such as assisted deliveries) has
expanded most rapidly that inequities of access have
been most reduced [19]. In other words, effectiveness
was not achieved by sacrificing equity. Just as the think-
ing of certain economists has evolved, so too has that of
West African policy-makers. When we initiated the
research program (2009) presented in this Supplement,
the great majority of those in authority were still in
favour of user fees and very reluctant to abolish them.
Today, however, it is very rare to hear anyone proclaim
loudly and clearly that they are against eliminating user
fees. Of course, this does not mean that behind closed
doors, or in small committees, the resistance to
eliminating user fees has evaporated. Publicly, however,
no one appears ready to call for re-institutionalizing user
fees.
This transition from user fees to their abolition is due
in part to the failure of public policies in the 1980s and
1990s to improve healthcare access for the greatest
number of people.
Ineffective public policies around user fees and
exemptions
The start and end points here must be service utilization
and financial protection of the population, as these public
policies target primarily those proximal objectives, which
are also the objectives of universal health coverage [20].
Here we should look again at the situation as it was
before the institutionalization of user fees in West Africa,
as that situation is often forgotten or idealized. Decision-
makers in health ministries and their partners in these
regions generally consider the utilization rate of curative
consultations in healthcare to be one of the most signifi-
cant indicators of health system access. This rate, which
is the ratio between the annual number of consultations
and the number of inhabitants in the country, thus illus-
trates, to some extent, the level of accessibility from the
health centres’ standpoint. The World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) considers that, for the population as a
whole, there should be five curative consultations per
year per inhabitant [21]. We also know that a child will
have, on average, around four health problems a year
that require the use of modern health services [22]. In
the 1980s, these utilization rates ranged from 0.09 to 0.23
per year in Benin, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali
[23]. In other words, in Benin a person would use a
health centre once every 11 years, and in Burkina Faso,
once every four years. Clearly, these utilization rates
should be used with some caution, as the denominators
are often poorly defined [24] and, as such, these rates
only measure a fraction of real utilization of health ser-
vices available. Some of the key explanations put forward
for these low service utilization rates were the dysfunc-
tionality of the healthcare system, its lack of funding, the
continued levying of informal payments, and the lack of
drugs in the health centres. “For patients, the alternatives
were simple. Whether or not services were officially free, if
they had no money, they were not looked after, and if they
did have some, they occasionally were“ (authors’ transla-
tion) [25, p. 185]. As such, WHO and UNICEF encour-
aged the African States to adopt a so-called cost-recovery
policy, known as the Bamako Initiative (BI). Even the
Marxist-Leninist Mozambique of the late 1970s under-
took a reform to introduce user fees [25]. UNICEF’s idea
was to replenish health centres’ supplies of essential gen-
eric drugs (EGDs) so that patients could be treated at
lower cost. However, to ensure the sustainability of the
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EGD supply, it was decided that patients would be asked
to pay user fees directly to the health centres, which
would retain this income locally (contrary to what some-
times occurred before then, which was that payments
would be centralized and absorbed into the administra-
tive maze, as they represented only 5% of the overall
health budget [26]). This income, managed by a commit-
tee of local representatives to reinforce the community-
based approach and local ‘governance’, was to be used to
replenish EGD stocks. The profits were intended to cover
certain minimal expenses associated with the centre’s
activities, but also to improve service quality and equity.
In addition to selling EGDs, some countries decided, at
the outset or later on, to charge fees for medical acts as
well. As such, in the 1990s, all West African countries
were involved in implementing this partial cost-recovery
policy.
Five years after this policy was implemented, studies
led and funded by UNICEF noted that service utilization
rates had risen. They were multiplied by factors of 1.5 to
5.6, depending on the country, or between 0.16 and 0.31
new consultations per year per person [23]. Yet in the
best case at that time (Benin, with 0.31), this represented
just one consultation every three years. In Niger, the
institutionalization of user fees in 1995 reduced the num-
ber of new cases treated in the district of Tillabery by
40% [27]. That study confirmed the results of the 1993
pilot project in Niger, in which a 32% drop in consulta-
tions was observed among the poor after user fees of
200 F CFA (USD 0.27) were introduced [28]. In Burkina
Faso, the introduction of user fees for consultations in
1997, on top of the fees for drugs, reduced utilization by
15% in the district of Kongoussi [29]. In 1993 in Niger,
only 11% of poor and sick persons went to a health cen-
tre; in Burkina Faso that proportion was 17% in 1994,
and in Senegal, 29% in 1991 [30]. By 2010, 20 years after
that reform, there had been almost no change in these
rates, which ranged from 0.30 in Guinea to 0.36 in Bur-
kina Faso. In other words, health services were not being
used, or just barely, making those health systems ineffi-
cient [31]. Moreover, a multi-country study showed that,
in the context of user fees, health centres were used
more by the well-off than by the poor [32]. On top of
that, when exemptions were implemented in this cost-
recovery system, more than 70% of those were monopo-
lized by the non-poor [30]. Today, most national surveys
in the West African region confirm this low utilization.
Less than half of sick children go to a health centre for
care (see all the Demographic Health Surveys - DHSs).
Even in Rwanda, often cited as an example of success in
Africa, only one-third of sick children go to health cen-
tres, in a context where health mutuals (which cover 85%
of the population) demand a co-payment at the point of
service [33].
One of the key achievements of these policies consisted
of bringing drugs back into health centres, especially in
countries that were able to organize a drug supply system
and an effective national purchasing agency. However,
this was not the case everywhere; in some countries, such
as Niger and Ivory Coast, the central purchasing agencies
were very ineffective [34]. This presence of drugs in
health centres was the only successful outcome of the BI,
which failed in all other respects. Community participa-
tion and the populations’ reinforced role in health centre
management most often did not work out well, as
observed in Senegal, Mali, Niger, and elsewhere in Africa
[35,36]. Health centre personnel made most decisions
and had increasing power over community-based man-
agement committees. So-called community participation
most often referred only to users’ financial participation,
a situation deplored by those at UNICEF who originally
conceived this policy [37]. The fees collected from
patients who were able to pay for treatment at health
centres were hoarded away and never used to improve
equity of access to care. The profits on drug sales were
sometimes well above official norms, as was health work-
ers’ share of user fees [38]. Lastly, the most flagrant fail-
ure of these policies concerned the care of indigents, or
exemption from user fees for the worst-off, according to
the vocabulary of that time and Principle 7 of the BI.
While this measure was intended from the outset-even if
today UNICEF promoters insist that was not the case
[39]-no country has wanted to grapple with this issue,
and indigents have remained at the margins of healthcare
systems [40].
All of these failures to improve service utilization, taken
together, led stakeholders involved with user fee policies
to modify their views. They reached the point, after South
Africa in 1994, of wondering whether one solution might
be to simply abolish user fees altogether. Thus, key leaders
of African States, the European Commission, the United
Nations, and the African Union called for abolition
[41,42]. Other articles in this supplement describe these
policies, so we will not go into the details here. However,
for the historical reflection proposed here, which requires
a broader perspective, we should remember that the
impacts of exemption policies in Africa have, overall, been
modest. Today they appear to be less substantial than
decision-makers were expecting.
Of course there are methodological issues, since it is
difficult to attribute changes to policies in contexts where
decision-makers do not take methodological issues into
account in their decisions, as a recent World Bank inter-
national study on universal coverage also concluded [43].
Reviews of the literature on these impacts reveal all the
shortcomings of the research methodologies used, which
were most often based on data from health centres,
employed statistical methods that were not sophisticated
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enough for causal attribution, examined time frames that
were too brief, or did not have sufficiently robust control
groups [44,45]. These weaknesses are, of course, inherent
in all evaluation processes examining public policies in
natural contexts. However, these studies also highlight
the desperate lack of rigorous data on the impacts of
these policies in Africa, even if the trends regarding their
positive impacts all point in the same direction [44,45].
In Burkina Faso, for instance, statistical modelling
demonstrated that the lives of 14,000 to 19,000 children
under five could be saved if a fee exemption policy that
was shown to be effective in one region were to be scaled
up nationally [46].
Let us consider the example of one country where the
needs are among the greatest in Africa: Niger, for which
three robust studies have provided very useful data. A
first study showed that interventions targeting child sur-
vival (free care policy, bed net distribution, malnutrition
reduction program) saved nearly 60,000 lives compared
with the situation in 1998 [47]. However, with their
methodology it was not possible to isolate the impacts of
the free care policy because several major interventions
were implemented concurrently. A second study carried
out in four districts in Niger concluded that, in 2009,
70% of sick children went to a health centre, whereas that
proportion had been only 14% before the fee exemption
[48]. A third study described the rise in health centre uti-
lization after the implementation of free care for children.
Although the rise was immediate and substantial (+98%)
when the policy was implemented country-wide, it
remained at that level until the end of the study period in
December 2008. At the same time, however, there was
considerable heterogeneity in the changes in the different
districts; for example, four of the 11 districts studied
were not able to sustain the immediate impacts on utili-
zation after 18 months of implementation, but utilization
stagnated in only one of those four [49]. These three stu-
dies thus indicated that the situation for Nigerien chil-
dren had improved greatly during the first two years of
the policy’s implementation. However, given the major
problems that country encountered in implementing the
exemption policy after 2009 (Diarra & Ousséini, this
issue), this success must be reconsidered in light of the
fact that most of the health centres subsequently declared
bankruptcy [50]. Sierra Leone, where nearly 85% of sick
children were able to go to a health centre after three
months of fee exemptions, compared to 45% previously
[51], appeared to be experiencing the same situation. In
Zambia, the initial rise in service utilization (+32%)
eroded over time, settling at only 19% after 18 months of
implementation [49]. Impacts were definite but short-
term, as the policy ran out of steam, problems arose in
implementation, and drug shortages intensified, particu-
larly due to lack of funds to support the policy [52], or to
such funds being purely and simply diverted, as was
the case in Sierra Leone [53]. In Zambia, the exemption
policy did not seem to have affected the availability of
drugs [54], and, in any case, drug shortages occurred
regardless of whether or not the health centres applied
the exemption [55]. In Mali, the policy providing free
malaria treatment to children led to only a 30% increase
in consultations [56], and the rise in the number of cae-
sareans after medical acts and kits were made free was
also modest but significant in one region (Kayes) for
women living in cities with hospitals [57]. However, that
study also showed that the predicted probability of survi-
val for mothers and newborns was improved (on the
order of 10 percentage points) after free caesareans were
introduced, in both cities and villages. These results take
into account factors that might influence that probability,
such as the women’s ages, the district, clinical indica-
tions, history of caesareans, and existence of a referral-
evacuation system. However, women continue to pay a
heavy financial price for caesareans, and between 20%
and 50% of households still face catastrophic expenses
[58,59]. These few examples testify to the currently lim-
ited impacts of exemption policies in Africa. It would be
just as easy to show numerous other cases where the
impacts are not limited, but simply non-existent or desta-
bilizing, as is the case for the elderly, children, and par-
turients in Senegal [60,61], adults in Zambia [49], or even
pregnant women and women in Sudan or Ethiopia
[62,63].
On the other hand, two counter-examples can be pre-
sented to show that West African States are, in fact,
able to find the means to make their exemption policies
work. Both have to do with childbirth policies in two
neighbouring countries.
First, in Ghana, the fee exemption policy for deliveries
implemented in 2005 and its subsequent incorporation
into the national health insurance contributed greatly to
the increase in facility-based deliveries with qualified
personnel. By the end of 2009, more than 70% of deliv-
eries occurred in maternity units, according to informa-
tion produced in seven health districts. This exemption
policy also reduced inequalities in utilization, as it was
women from the poorest households who benefited
most. Of course, the policy alone could not eliminate
these inequalities, but it helped to reduce them. The gap
in assisted delivery rates between the least poor and the
poorest went from 65% in 2004, before the first policy,
to 54% in 2009 [64].
Next, we turn to the national policy to subsidize
assisted deliveries and caesareans in Burkina Faso. This
policy’s impacts have been impressive and could serve
as proof to refute the hypothesis that West African
States are incapable of seriously organizing a public pol-
icy. In some of the country’s rural districts, with no
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external partner involvement, nearly 90% of women
today deliver in the maternity unit of a health centre
with qualified personnel. Expenses related to deliveries
have also been substantially reduced [65,66]. However,
while these changes definitely qualify as successes in
comparison with other countries in the region, numer-
ous limitations should be noted. First, this is not a user
fee abolition policy, but rather a subsidy, as the women
still have to pay 20% of the costs as estimated by the
Ministry of Health of Burkina Faso (i.e., USD 1.25).
Then, total exemption from payment, funded by the
State and adopted by the Parliament (without dedicated
outside funding), was planned for indigent women.
However, this exemption has never been applied, nor
has any support ever been provided to health workers to
ensure this measure’s application (most are not even
aware it exists), even though the funding is available
[67]. Lastly, there is a persistent discrepancy in the
implementation, since numerous studies have shown, in
several districts of the country, that over half of the
women paid more than the standard fee required
[65,68,69]. Thus, in a context where the financial and
human resources are all in place to support the policy’s
implementation, parturients continue to be victims of
improper implementation, and inequalities between the
poor and others persist, whereas they could have been
mitigated if the funding voted for indigent women had
been used as intended.
There is thus an implementation problem that
explains, to some extent, the ineffectiveness of policies
in West Africa (Olivier de Sardan, this issue). The user
fee policies of the 1980s and 1990s made it possible
finally to have drugs on hand locally, but only for people
with the capacity to pay. Community participation, care
for indigents, and quality of care (aside from drug avail-
ability) were neglected. The exemption policies of the
2000s have significantly improved access to care, but
they are difficult to sustain, their implementation is
chaotic, their funding is inadequate for the needs, and
they have not yet managed to reduce the inequities of
access to the healthcare system. And yet, whether for
user fees or their abolition, a great deal of scientific and
experiential knowledge was available to ensure the poli-
cies’ design and implementation would be effective and
equitable. Many pilot projects had been conducted in
West Africa whose results could have been used to
good effect, which was not done. Of course, as shown
by Olivier de Sardan et al. (this issue), there are numer-
ous challenges associated with scaling up and funding
these policies and with using the knowledge from these
pilot projects [5,70], to which we will return. We will
show this in the next section before putting forward, in
the conclusion, some explanations for this problematic
knowledge transfer process at a time when there is a
growing trend toward having evidence-based medicine
represented at the public policy table [70].
Pilot projects that are essential yet unused/
unusable
When UNICEF launched the cost-recovery policy
(WHO being opposed to this initiative at that time
[37]), some questioned how it was possible to proceed
so quickly when the new policies were based only on a
few pilot experiments: “It is dangerous to jump from two
small projects to a multimillion dollar enterprise“ [71].
In Niger and Burkina Faso, experiments had been orga-
nized and driven by American aid agencies (USAID); in
Benin, Guinea, and Mali (in particular) by UNICEF; and
in Cameroon by German aid agencies [23,28,72]. Subse-
quently these experiments greatly influenced the politi-
cal agenda toward selecting user fees as a solution for
improving access to care. Lee and Goodman [14], in
analyzing this period, state that “in the area of HCF
[health care financing], a global elite has come to domi-
nate policy discussions through their control of financial
resources and, perhaps more importantly, control of the
terms of debate through their expert knowledge, support
of research, and occupation of key nodes in the global
policy network.” These pilot projects most often showed
that the imposition of user fees, associated with the pre-
sence of drugs (which promoters took as an approxi-
mate measure of improvement in care quality), had
made it possible for many more people to attend health
centres. As we saw above, these utilization levels, while
often higher than before, were nevertheless very low,
and remained low 20 years after the fact. A synthesis
article showed that some pilot projects even asserted
that quality improvements could offset the negative
impact of introducing user fees [73]. In Cameroon, for
example, user fees without any quality improvement had
negative impacts on the use of services by the worst-off.
However, those authors showed that better availability
of drugs in the health centres made up for the negative
impacts of user fees [72], even for the worst-off, a result
also seen in an experience in Niger [28]. On the other
hand, other studies then explained that the links
between price, quality, and utilization are more complex
than that, and that the different aspects of each of these
dimensions can affect outcomes. Quality improvement
does not automatically compensate for negative effects
of higher prices on service utilization [73].
Moreover, none of these experiments in the 1990s
focused seriously on access to care for indigents, on
attempts at cross-subsidization, or on exemptions [40,74].
Even in the early 2000s, when a non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) project funded entirely by the European
Union was set up for three years in northern Burkina Faso
to help this health region organize cost recovery (whose
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shortcomings had been known for years), the issue of indi-
gence was completely neglected. It was considered too
complicated and not a priority by all the project’s stake-
holders, who were focused on geographic access to drugs
[75]. Moreover, one of the few studies undertaken to
understand why this issue was not addressed showed that
there was no window of opportunity nor any political
entrepreneur available to propose solutions for indigent
access to healthcare, which, in any case, was not consid-
ered a public problem [76]. One of the few NGOs inter-
ested in the issue of indigence in Africa [77], funded by
UNICEF at the time, abandoned this issue. It gave up its
attempted interventions for the worst-off, deciding instead
to invest in supporting community-based health insurance
plans, which never bother with the indigent [78].
However, these experiments were all largely controlled
by major international actors, and any success they had
was due to the personal motivation of local managers
[79,80]. The problems they experienced in responding to
population needs, the financial barrier created by user
fees, and the lack of consideration for equity were never
actually taken into account when public cost-recovery
policies were being established and implemented. It was
simply decided that these should be organized, and it was
done, regardless of any scientific evidence about their dif-
ficulties and deficiencies. A little later in the narrative,
near the end of the 2000s, the few, very rare operational
studies undertaken to incorporate indigent care into
cost-recovery systems revealed shortcomings of their
own [81,82]. In Burkina Faso, studies indicated that rural
communities could be effectively mobilized to select indi-
gents [83,84] without causing social stigmatization [85].
However, at the same time, those studies highlighted
rural households’ feeble capacity to contribute financially
to providing care for the worst-off. In other words, con-
sidering the poverty of rural areas, it did not seem feasi-
ble to expect the poor, who rarely use paid services at
health centres, to fund, by means of user fees, access to
free care for the indigent. It was difficult to ask the poor
to fund exemptions for the very poor. The principles of
the BI, under which payments were required from some
patients while others were exempted at the most decen-
tralized levels of the healthcare system, thus came up
against the reality of households’ contributive capacity.
The issue of the losses generated by these exemptions
and whether they should be covered centrally by the
State is fundamental, but has rarely been considered.
This is why, all along, and most recently through WHO
and the movement for universal coverage [20], there has
been a push to fund healthcare based on the principle of
prepaid contributions shared at the national level and
adapted to people’s capacity to pay.
But before these principles were given concrete
expression, or any political will was felt, as happened in
Ghana, other pilot projects were conducted in the mid-
2000s in certain West African countries that had not
engaged heavily in exemption policies. Most often these
projects experimented with fee exemptions, not only for
the indigent, but also for categories of people considered
vulnerable (children, pregnant women, etc.), and most
often directly in line with Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). This was the case in Burkina Faso, Mali,
Niger (see 4th section below), as well as in Ivory Coast,
Guinea, and the Democratic Republic of Congo [86-88].
As in the cost-recovery projects, these were aimed at
demonstrating the principle, but in the opposite direc-
tion, i.e., showing the effectiveness and equity of user
fee abolition. In all cases, the outcomes were conclusive,
but the magnitude of the increase in utilization was
beyond comparison with the experiments of the 1990s.
Utilization reached record highs for such data, to our
knowledge. In these pilot projects, utilization was so
great that most often, after a few years, it neared opti-
mal satisfaction of population health needs. Utilization
rates were nearly three (sometimes more) consultations
per year per child. More than 80% of sick children went
to health centres, and almost all women gave birth in
maternity units [89,90]. The weight of the financial bar-
rier in determining utilization was clearly demonstrated
as, most often, these experiments did not address geo-
graphic barriers to care. Like the cost-recovery projects,
these experiments were largely under the control of
international organizations (with a greater preponderance
of NGOs, compared with the 1990s), but with a certain
heterogeneity of processes. On one side were the NGOs
‘without borders’, whose actions followed a substitutive
approach; this was the case in some districts of Mali, in
Guinea Conakry, and in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. On the other side, some NGOs attempted to inte-
grate their projects into the healthcare system and essen-
tially took on the role of third-party payers who paid
health centres on behalf of patients, as was done in
Burkina Faso.
However, what is most remarkable is that the lessons
derived from these pilot projects of the 2000s were no
more taken into account in public policies than the
results of the 1990s cost-recovery projects had been. In
Niger, for example, the State drafted its free care policy
for children under five without taking into account the
results of a pilot project, despite the fact that they were
well known and had been studied by the authorities
[91]. In Mali, a pilot project showed that making drugs
free without removing user fees for consultations did
not adequately satisfy population needs [92]. Neverthe-
less, the State followed this principle in drafting its
policy (Touré, this issue), with the result that the out-
comes were limited. Trials in Burkina Faso showed that
many more women used maternity units when deliveries
Ridde BMC Health Services Research 2015, 15(Suppl 3):S6
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/15/S3/S6
Page 6 of 11
were free than when they were only subsidized [93], and
a study showed that the budget voted by the National
Assembly for this policy was enough to organize such
an exemption [67]. Yet the State continued to require
women to pay, to ‘participate’ financially, with the stated
aim (debunked by scientific evidence [11]) of making
people ‘responsible’ [94].
Still, Burkina Faso did occasionally take into account
the results of pilot projects, as Ghana did when decision-
makers decided to scale up the free delivery policy to the
national level after a pilot in four regions [95]. For
instance, in Burkina Faso, trials of cost-sharing for cae-
sareans in some districts of the country [96] enabled the
authorities to estimate the caesarean costs that needed to
be taken into account in the emergency obstetrics and
newborn care (EmONC) policy. They also decided, in a
move that was quite unusual in the region, to cover the
full cost of transportation between the health centre and
the district hospital for emergency obstetric cases. Yet
this remains an isolated example, as most often decision-
makers in Burkina Faso have no desire to carry out pilot
projects to inform their decisions. We see this currently
with regard to the introduction of pay-for-performance,
which has been widely promoted by the World Bank. In
the fight against malaria, the situation is even more dis-
turbing. In fact, the national policy for home-based
malaria treatment by community health workers
(PECADO) was deployed country-wide without waiting
for the results of pilot projects that the State itself had
organized in three districts. Thus, Burkina Faso remains
a baffling case of inconsistent choices by decision-
makers, who most often say they do not want pilot pro-
jects (the case of pay-for-performance), but sometimes
commission them (malaria), sometimes accept their exis-
tence (free care programs), but do not often take them
into account (caesareans).
The challenges of using pilot projects in drafting
public policies
In theory, those drafting a public policy should take into
account lessons derived from prior studies to ensure the
policy is contextually appropriate and to avoid any devia-
tion in its implementation, so that the objectives might
be attained. However, the example of the institutionaliza-
tion and subsequent abolition of user fees in West Africa
seems to demonstrate that this is not done.
Scaling up any healthcare innovation, such as user fees
or their abolition, is clearly not easy, as there are numer-
ous factors to take into account, above and beyond the
innovation’s intrinsic instrumental components. Factors
that require particular attention include the functioning
of the healthcare system and its particular shortcomings,
the characteristics of the organization promoting the
pilot project, such as NGOs (perceived by the State as
being too often focused on rights, social context and
environment, on values related to equity, and on
problems related to healthcare funding), as well as the
scaling-up approach used during the course of the
experiment [97].
How this scaling-up of fee exemption pilot projects is
to be funded is certainly a core issue. However, more
than being a question of means, this issue appears to us
to be a matter of political will and priorities in the public
agenda. The first thing to note is that almost no African
countries give sufficient priority to the health sector. The
objective of dedicating 15% of the State’s budget to this
sector (Abuja Declaration, 2001) is rarely met (13.6% in
Burkina Faso, 10% in Mali, 11.1% in Niger) [98]. Yet
national and international resources are often available.
Certainly, we could mention here the new mining and oil
revenues available to the three countries covered by our
research program, even though access to information on
this subject is limited. We could also, however, point to
the example of Mali, where 31 billion franc CFA was allo-
cated for Ministry of Health activities in 2009 from exter-
nal (and therefore available) funding, but was never paid
out [99]. As well, certain national resources normally
allocated for the poor are sometimes misused. The 120
billion franc CFA released by the Burkinabè government
during the 2008 crisis to help the worst-off actually bene-
fited the more affluent [100]. This 120 billion franc CFA
should be considered in comparison with the 2 billion
franc CFA annual budget of the national childbirth sub-
sidy program. The issue here is one of priorities and
proper use of resources. In recent years, Ghana has had
the political intent to increase its value-added tax (VAT)
(which remains progressive [101]) to fund two-thirds of
its national health insurance [95]. Meanwhile, in 2012,
Niger and Gabon managed to mobilize 2 billion F CFA
to send their football teams to the Africa Cup of Nations!
Finally, more resources would be available at the interna-
tional level if donor countries would respect their com-
mitment to devote 0.7% of their gross national product
to public development aid [102].
Thus, it makes little sense for certain NGOs or interna-
tional aid agencies to set up pilot projects in Africa with-
out bothering to adapt them adequately to States’
capacities, beyond demonstrating a principle that might,
in some situations, still be important to carry out. A bet-
ter solution would be to adopt a stepwise approach in
which pilot projects would be organized by and for the
State. To some extent, this is what has been done in Bur-
kina Faso over the past few years with regard to fee
exemptions for children under five. Some NGOs and
their funding agencies worked together to implement
pilot projects that were increasingly integrated into the
health system context (even to the extent, after five years,
of asking the districts to manage the reimbursement of
Ridde BMC Health Services Research 2015, 15(Suppl 3):S6
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fees with the NGO’s budget), while producing evidence
that could inform national decision-making [103]. The
State took the time to understand these projects (2008-
2012), to carry out its own feasibility study for a national
policy (2012), and to produce a well-argued strategic
document (2013) that was submitted to the Ministry of
Health. History (and research) will tell whether this pro-
cess was helpful to the Burkinabè authorities in their
decision-making.
However, we have seen that, for political reasons, deci-
sion-makers balk at the pilot project approach, in the
name of equal treatment for all, but also because of the
difficulty of explaining to citizens the value of such
experiments. Nevertheless, even when these experiments
are taken into account, if the evidence shows that user
fees do not make patients more ‘responsible’, or that
exempting people from paying for drugs but not for
consultations has only limited benefits, decision-makers
often have trouble considering these facts. Of course, we
can challenge those naïve researchers who believe public
policies should be based only on evidence, setting aside
political concerns. On the other hand, we might also ask
whether decision-makers’ own knowledge and ideologies
might not be impediments (that should be taken into
account rather than ignored) to the formulation of
appropriate public policies [104,105]. In the case of user
fees, their ideas about the role of the market or of the
State certainly underlie their understanding of the policy
instrument. The economic framework has taken centre
place in public policy formulation [106]. However, to
those who read most of the documentation on national
health policies and other national health development
programs in that region, this comes as no surprise, as
these documents are not based on any scientific refer-
ences, whether local or international.
A recent study in another region of Africa (Uganda)
than the one covered in this article appeared to show,
conversely, that decision-making on user fees abolition
policy was influenced by evidence [107]. However, it
also showed that community complaints appeared to
exert the greatest influence on decision-makers, yet
these types of data are based on public opinion and not
on information verified by research.
Conclusion
There is thus a real discrepancy between the current
state of knowledge on healthcare user fees and their
abolition, on one hand, and how that knowledge is
taken into account in public policies, on the other.
Involving decision-makers as early as possible in reflect-
ing on research priorities, implementing them and then
applying results is certainly one approach that should
continue to be promoted, even though it presents signif-
icant challenges [70]. It is tempting to think that the
ways in which lessons from pilot projects are used do
not follow any clear logic. It may also be, however, that
this situation is caused by cognitive dissonance, in
which only those lessons that reinforce the authorities’
existing ideas are retained, while those that contradict
their beliefs are dismissed. Thomas Kida [108] reminds
us, indeed, that “by selectively focusing on supporting
information, we ignore contradictory information that
may be very relevant to the decisions we make.” Pierre
Muller quite rightly asked “where does this idea come
from, that a public policy expresses a sort of ‘truth’ of
the moment, not based on the outcome of a scientific
experiment, but because it corresponds to the actors’
beliefs?” (authors’ translation) [109]. This opens up a
new field of research, to our knowledge as yet unex-
plored in West Africa, which would study the links
between researchers and decision-makers, between
science and policy, and between ideas and evidence.
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